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DETERMINA TS OF THE PA YME T METHOD IN
ACQUISITIO S
Ken C Yoo~
George M. McCabe

I TRODUCTI 0 1

Previous research has shown that the fonn of payment 1s important m explammg returns to both
bidder and target shareholders. Abnonnal returns for bidders in stock acqu1sn1ons are significantly
negative while abnormal returns in cash acquisitions are ,ero or posiuve (for example, see Brown and
Ryngaen, 1991, Tnfts, 1991, Travlos and Pappioannou 1991 Travlos, 19K7. and Wansley, Lane, and
Yang. 19 3, 1987). This empirical evidence of larger return, in cash offers when compared to stock
exchange offers implies that the choice of exchange medium has economic significance.
Why does such a different wealth effect exist? What charactemtiC\ of bidders who prefer cash
payment differen11a1e them from bidders sclccung stock payment? The htcrature suggests several
theories to answer these questions. However. many of these theories lack empirical verificauon, and no
a11emp1 has been made 10 synthesize the models and test their combined 11nphca11ons. This paper
proposes an empirical analysis directed at joint!} assc,smg fhe h:,,potheses on the choice of payment
method m acqu1si11ons.

THEORIE ABO T THE PAYMENT METHOD AND T H EIR PROPO ED
VAR I ABLES
Probably the most prevalent early explanation of the choice of payment method was 1ha1 II was
dmen by the taX code: ca.sh-payment acqu1s111ons qualif 1ed for a stepped up bam and non-cash-paymcm
acquis1uons received the benefits of tax loss and credu carr} to""ards. I lo"'ever, empirical studies have
fa1 led 10 support 1h1s (for a more rigorous discu,sion. see Yool., McCabe, and Shoemaker. I992).
Although d1fficult1es m accurately measuring the actual tax gains are commonly c11ed as the reason,
Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson ( 1988) have shown 1ha1 there 1s no direct Iml.age between tax bcnehts and
payment mode.' This paper. therefore, focuses on other theories Five hypotheses and the variables
implied by them are discussed belo"'

J ensen 's Free Cash Flow T heory
Jensen ( 1986, 1988) predicts that manager, of !inns "-llh cash flow m excess of profitable
mves1ment opponurnues will '>(Juander II on wa;tcful perquis11es and overinve,tment Managers of 1hese
firms are assumed to attach greater value 10 perquis11cs and finn s1Le than to the benefits of paymg excess
ca!>h flow out 10 shareholders m d1v1dends or stock repurcha,e,. Jensen abo argue, 1ha1 II 1, possible to
reduce these wa;1eful expend11ures by binding management 10 pay out future cash flows. Acqu15111ons
forca!>h either use up excess funds, divert funds from mternal mve,tmcnts, or cause the bidder 10 mcur
debt. In any case, they reduce the d1scre11onary cash now available 10 management. Thus. Jensen's
theory would predict a positive response 10 cash acqu1s111ons by bidders with cru.h now m excess of
profitable mtcmal inves1mcnt opponun111es. For these bidders a cash bid should be cheaper than a stock
bid so they should be more likely to make cash bids.
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Empincal mvesugauon of these theories has been hampered by an inadequate definition of free cash
now. Recently, Lang. Stulz. and Wall..ling ( 1991) provided an opera11onal definition of tree cash flow
They argue that a firm with Tobin's q less than one does not have profitable internal investment
opponunities. Lehn and Poulsen ( 1989) had previousI> def med free cash tlo" as operatmg mcome
before depreciation less mterest expenses. taxes. and preferred and common dividends. This paper
follows Lang, Stulz. and Walkling and defines firrn, wuh Irec cash flow as those wuh pos111ve Lehn and
Poulsen free cash flow and also "uh Tobin's q lcs, than one. The prediction 1s that fmm "ilh po,ui,c
free cash flow are more likely to use ca,h payment m acqu1s1t1on,.

Information Asymmetry Theory
The widely l..nown Myers and MaJlut ( 1984) model hypothesiles that equ1t> secunt1cs "111 be
issued only 1f management has 1ns1de 1..no" ledge that the tirm\ shares are o,ervalued. Thus, a ,tod.
issue signals to the market that the tirrn" o,ervalued and drives down the share price llanscn ( 1987)
expands this idea to a bilateral a,ymmctnc mtormat1on world where the bidders do not 1..no" the true
value of the targets and vice versa In this world. the target, which 1..nows Its true ,aluc, accepts cash
offers only when its value 1s bs than the otter made. The cash otter bidder be.trs the cost ot o, erp.1~ mg
for the target by melf To protect w,clt from the target\ adverse selection, therctorc the bidder may
choose stocl.. instead of cash. smce m that case the target shares the decrease m the marl-ct v,1lue ot the
bidder when the bidder overpaid tor the target.
In hght of two-agent bargammg strategies under tlm double lemon problem. Han.en developed a
s1gnallmg model m \\hllh the target uses both the exchange medium ottered and the amount ot the oiler
3l.S1gnalsofthe bidders ,atuc llan,cn's model yields several testable 1mplicauons hrst, tt sho"' that
the probab1hty of a ca,h otter decrca,es as the target inuea,e, m s11e relamc 10 the bidder Second, ll
shows that the probability ot cash otters mcrea,es \\-1th the target's debt le,el and decrea,e, "uh the
bidder's debt level.

Tax Advantaged Dividend ubstitutc~ ThcOr)
The tax ad,antaged d1, 1dend sub,tllutcs thcor) I\ similar l<l the Jensen\ free cash tlo" theOI) 111
that ll also tocuse, on tree cash tlo" Instead of tocusmg on the agcnc) relauonsh1p between
management and shareholders, ll cmphas1Les th..: cost, (111cre.1,cd taxes) ot trnn,tcrrmg thl\ excess cash
flow to shareholder,. Bierman ( 1985) demonstrates that there arc s1gnthcant tax mccnmes m the
personal mcome ta~ as \\ell as the corporate ta, tor one tim1 to acquire the share, of other !inns r,nhcr
than pay a cash d1,1deml.'
Buymg the shares 111 another t1m1 1s not equ1v,1lent to bu) mg bacl.. their 0\\11 shares e,en though
both produce similar tax ad,antages relau,c to d1, 1dend, 111 transtemng ,alue to shareholder,'
However, a bidders previous stocl.. repurchases may Signal the existence of tree cash tlo" and the
wilhngncs.s of management to pl.tee sharcholdcrs' mterest, first and a\'Old the agenc> and tax costs of tree
cash now by usmg tax advantaged dl\tnbuuons to shareholder, through cctsh acqu1S1t1,1ns. US1ng e,cess
cash flow to tund acqu1,1t1ons should m,oh,e lo\\er tran,arnon costs than buymg b,1cl.. stocl.. and
re1ssumg tt tor the acqu1w1on But the ,ame 111cent1,e \\Ould not be present tor a finn already 1ssumg
new equity Thu,. the probab1lit> of using ca,h a, a mean, of payment 1s higher tor !inns that have
recently repurchased their own ,hares and lower tor finm that ha,e recent I> l\sued ne" cqutt):

Optimal Capital tructure Theory
From the acquinng firm's v1cwpomt, the u,e of stocl.. a, payment tor acqu1s1t1on, can be v1e\\ed as
a new stock oftermg, and a cash payment (1f financed by debt) can be v1c\\cd as a debt ottering'
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Accordingly. theories of securities offerings and the associated changes in capital structure can be seen
to be related to the choice of payment mode.
The optimal capital structure theory say, that each !inn lias a unique optimal capital structure in
market equilibrium.• It implies that. in order to avoid the transaction co\ls of post-acquisition financial
restructuring, acqu1rers ought 10 structure acqu1s1t1on financing so the capital structure of the postacquisition firm is opt1mal. As an empirical approx1mat1on. thl\ optimum is taken to be the bidder's
7
preacqu1s1t1on level.
In this context, we expect that the discrepancy between the bidder rar~ets preacqu1sit1on combined
leverage and the bidders pre-acqu1s1t1on level of leverage "'111 influenu: the choice of the payment
method. Acquirers who expect their acqui;it1ons to re,ult in higher than optimal debt levels should pay
m stod. in order 10 adjust the equity poS1t1on of the pos1acqu1sit1on fmn. "'h1le ca,h ,hould be used in
acquisitions where lower than opt1mal debt level\ arc expected. Thus. the discrepancy between the two
fimi'sconsohdated leverage and the bidder's prcacqu1smon leverage (called here change m leverage) is
expected to decrease the hl-elihood of a cash of fer
Acquisition trategy Theory
When seeking the reason almost all host1le tender offers arc cash pa)ment, Huang and Walkling
(1987) suggest that bidding strategy ma) influence the fonn of pa1ment. In ;tock otters, a bidding firm
must obtain approval from the SEC before target ;hare holders begin 10 tender their shares. This process
could take several months. while bidders paymg cash could stan 10 acquire target shares w1thm ,everal
weeks.
Faster transactions could be crucial for success as extra time allo,\S target management and
competing bidders the opportunity 10 implement their strategics Interestingly. Jarrell, Brickley. and
Poulsen (19 ) suggest that the secular decline in the \tcx.k returns 10 bidders reflects the increased
compeut1on among bidders and the me of auction-style rnntests during the c1ght1c\. An mcrease m
muluple biddmg tends 10 reduce bidder returns and increase the target\ return. Thus, re\lstance by L1rge1
management often benefits owner managers by promoting an entry of compctmg bid;.•
Hostile offers and those likely to encounter compe11ng bids m,1)- have a higher probabiht) ol
success 1f they involve cash. Therefore. acqu1s1t1on, in which the bidder expect; target management
resistance and/or competmg bids are more hkcly 10 be for cash.
ummar y of Theories
The above discu'i.s1on leads to the 1dent1fica1ion of mne potcnt1al detcnn1nan1s of pa) ment method
in acquisi11ons. TI1e five theories and the variables they imply arc ,ummanzed 111 Table I. The
hypothesized sign of each variable sho"'s "'hether the cash pa1 ment likelihood is expected to var)
directly (+)or mversely (-) wnh that variable.

AMPLI 'G
The sample firms "ere selected by exam ming the COM PUSTAT lnduwial Research File for all
detisungs caused by acquis1t1on dunng the period 1980-1988. All dehstings "ere confirmed m the Wall
trect J ournal Index. Other crneria used for selcct1on of data were as follows:
I.

2.
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Data ava1lab11i1y of both bidder and target firms on the COMPUSTAT fi les.
Acqu1s111ons m which the medium of payment was kno"' n and took the form of ca,h or ,iock
exchange.•
pring 1995

3.

If the bidder's ownership of the target firm exceeded 50% before the takeover announcement. the
acquisition was eliminated from the sample
4_ In cases in which several acqu1s111ons were made by the same bidder, the bidder ,, counted
separately for each acquis111on made. but the sample includes only ca,;cs in whteh no other
acquisiuon has occurred in the preceding year
5. Consolidauons of corporauons. which are a combination of two or more corporauons mto a ne"
corporation. are excluded trom the sample
TABLE I
PAYME T METHOD T H EO RI ES A '1/D T H EIR PROPOSED \ ' \ RIABLE

Theories

Variables'

bpccted
sign'

Jensen's free cash n ow theory

Free cash now dummy

+

lnformauon asymmetry theory
(Hansen's model)

Target ·bidder s11e ratio
Bidder leverage
Target le, er,1ge

+

Tax advantaged d1, 1dend
subs111u1e theory

Bidder's pre,1ous stod.
repurchases
Bidder\ previous sttx:k issues

+

Compct111011 dummy
f argct reSJstancc dunun)

+
+

Op11mal cap11al structure
theory
Acqu1s111on strateg) theory

•For a completed descnpuon ot how these arc computed, ,ee the appcnd1,
• A pos111vc (negative) sign implies that the variable mrn:asc, the likelihood ot a c.ish (,1,x:k) otter.

Method ot payment "as idenuhed lrom the Wa ll trect J ournal The event date ol each
acqu1s111on 1s the date of the offer\ 1m11al announcement m the Wall St reet J ou rnal.
The total number ol acquin:d companies which were dcll\ted lrnm CO\IPCSTAT during the
sampling period 1s 602 Appl1ca11011 ol the above da1,1 requirement, resulted m a hnal sample ol 205
acqu1S111on events. 01 the 205 eve111s. I 52 acqu1,111,m, used cash pa) ment, and the rem.11n111g 53
acqu1s111ons used wx:k exchanges l11c comp0\III0n ol the es11ma11on sample 1, \ummar11ed m Table

2.
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TABLE 2
BY YEA R OF AN OU CEMENT
DI TRIBUTIO OFACQ I IT IO
Cash
Pa\ment
Year
7
1980
20
19 I
II
1982
16
1983
22
1984
24
1985
10
1986
15
1987
7
1988
152
Total
• Only two months m 1988 are covered.

tock
Excha nge
7
5
12
6
5
4
9
5
0
53

Total
14
25
23
22
27
28
39
20
7•
205

EMPIRICAL RE ULT
Sample means for each variable and t-stausucs. for both the ca,h payment group and the stock
exchange group. are displayed m Table 3.
ARI ABLE MEANS AND

Variable"
Free cash flow dummy
Target-bidder size
Target leverage
Bidder leverage
Bidder stock repurchase
Bidder stock issue
Change m leverage
Compe1111on dummy
Target resistance dummy

TABLE J
'I\ ARIATE TE T STATISTIC •

Cash
ea\ ment
0.316
0.467
0.306
0.318
0.044
0. 171
0.004
0.355
0.145

Stock
exchange
0 125
0 283
0 110
0.302
0.016
0.Q38
0.00
0.056
0.066

Difference in means
1-statistics
2.447'
1.809'
-0. 112
0.525
3.309'
3.295'
-1.435
5.921'
2.050'

'From a sample of 205 acquisitions occurring during 1980-1988. r or more details on the sample. see
section 3.
• For a completed descnp11on of how these are computed, see the appendix.
'Significant at the 0.0 I level
• Significant at the 0.05 level
' Significant at the 0.10 level
The foUowmg logu regression 1s used to model the selection of cash vs. stock payment as func11ons
of proposed determinants:
Log[P/ ( 1-P,)] - a0 + a,(Free cash flow)1 + a2'Target-bidder size),+ a,(Bidder leverage), +
a,(Target leverage),+ a,(B1dder's stock repurchase), + a 6(Biddcr's stock issue),+ a,(Change 111
leverage), + a,(Compet111on), + aiTarget Resistance), + e,.
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where P, 1s the probability of a cash offer and ( 1-P) 1s the probabiluy of a stock ofter. Table 4 reports
parametercstimates and the associated t-staustics for three different logu models. Model I includes all
nine explanatory variables. The two other models differ in whether target and bidder debt ratios arc
included separately or combined into a single variable The opumal capual structure theory suggests that
the choice of payment 1s affected by the deviation of the combined finn s leverage from the opumum.
thus. the single variable change in leverage Hansen\ model. on the other hand. argues tor the use ol
each finn's debt ratio separately High correlauom may make interpretauom ol the three variables in
model I problematic; hence. the; arc entered ,eparatdy in models 2 and l Aho presented in the tabk
are the p~udo-R' for ea,h verston ol the mOllel which provides an indication ot the overall cxplanat<>r}
power of the model and the Jil..d1hood ratio statistic that tests its statistical s1gmticance. 11 I!
First. Jensen's free cash flow theory 1s strong!) supported by the results ot the log1t model .is "di
as the univariate analysis. The tree cash tlow dummy, "hich 1s assigned a value ot one 11 the bidder ha,
a below average q ratio and an abo,e a,erage tree ca,h llo\l. ,md zero othemise. 1, s1gmt11:ant at the 0.0 I
level in all vers1om, of the logu analysis hm1, that have unprolltable mtcmal 11ivcstmcnt opportumt1c,
and con,iderable free c.1sh tlo" tend to mal-.c cash acqui,1t1ons.
T\BLE4
ESTl'\-1 \H.S OF LOG IT '\-IODEL .
\lode! 2
:\1odcl I
I ·n74
t .2K95
(2 7KI )'
(2.749)'
0 .109 1
0.0168
Target-bidder si,e
(-0.197)
(-0.277)
Target leverage
1.4978
( 1.249)
-0.9242
Bidder leverage
(·0.6KK)
11..1577
Bidder stocl-. repurchase
11.0408
(2 422)'
(2.410)
Bidder Sl(X: K I\\UC
6.4047
5 \447
( 1.959)'
( l.!s-16)
Change m leverage
2.KI 15
-7.3037
( 1.462)
(-1 I 23)
2.4906
Compct1t1on dummy
2.5551
('.l.909)'
(l 974)
Target rc\1\tance dummy
I 2295
I 10.W
(I 751)J
( I 826)J
Constant
0.2209
0.4055
( 0.787)
(-0.K47)
Psuedo-R2
0210
0.196
Likelihood ratio
47.676
46.084
• The l·\tatist1c. computed to tc,t the null h}ll<lthesi, that the estimated coctt1c1cnt
shown m parentheses for each coellicicnt estimates
• Significant at the 0.0 I level
S1gn1ficant at the 0.05 level
'Significant at the 0. 10 level

Variable,
Free cash flow dummy

Sot11hern Business Review

\lode! 3
1.2995
(2.699)'
0.06.U
(0.176)
0 4121
(0.4!\6)
0.06.•6
(0.057)
11.ISW
(2 426)'
'\.K271
( t.S16)

2.4818
('.l.S94)"
1.2%4
(1.81'\)J
-0.4261
( 0.899)
0197
45.810
is equal to zero. is
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The acquisition strategy theory suggests that acquisitions. for which there is compe1i1ion or which
face resistance by 1arge1 management, are more likely 10 be for cash. The compe1ilion dummy is the
single most significant variable in both 1he univariate analys1~ and logit analysis. The sample for this
srudy includes 58 con1es1ed bids. Fifty-five ~f these con1es1ed b1dde~ used cash payment. Funhermore,
almost 1wo-1hirds of those 58 contested bids wc~c won by com pet mg bidders, not initial bidders. All
those successful competing bidders except one offered cash payment. The one exception was a while
knight who was induced 10 bid by the target's incumbent management. These findings confinn rhar cash
is a more effective bargaining 1001 for bidders who are facmg cx1s11ng bids or expecting 10 encounter
competing bids.
However, 1he target management's res1s1ancc dummy. while sigmficant al lhe 0.05 level in lhe
univariate analysis, is only sigmficanl al 1he 0.10 level m the log11 models. However. mos1 hostile
takeovers in which the target's management initially res1s1s eventually become friendly takeovers. h may
be 1ha1, at 1he beginning. the target resists mducmg a raised bid bur later accepts the raised bid. Our
variable "1arge1resistance" measures resistance on 1he day of 1he announcement. In our sample, all
takeovers in which the 1arge1 resisted lo 1he end (a 101al ol 1 of the 31 that mi11ally resisted) were cash
payments. This fac1together with 1he high significance of 1he compe1111on dummy variable provide 1he
s1ronges1 possible support for 1he acquisition s1ra1cgy theory.
The rax advantaged dividend subsun11e theory has somewhat mixed suppon. The variable bidder's
share repurchase is significant ar 1he 0.05 level m all version, ol 1he log11 analysis. In essence,
managements willing 10 seek our 1ax advantaged means ol d1s1ribu11ons to shareholders (e.g. by
repurchasing their stocks) are, ceteris paribus, more likely 10 engage in cash acqu1s111ons. This close
relationship between share repurchases and cash acqu1s111on, 1, abo found by other studies (for example.
see Shoven and Simon. 1987; Auerbach and Re1shu<,. 1987). The bidder\ ,rock issue variable 1s
s1a11s1ically significant bur has 1he oppos11e sign 10 1ha1 predicted mdica1mg that bidders who have
recently issued common ,rock are more hkel) 10 use cash payment. This lindmg 1s 111cons1s1cm wi1h our
presumption 1ha1 finns that issued s1ock may nor have free cash llov. or deb1 capacity 10 make cash
acquis1uons and therefore rend to use stock payments. This sign can be rauonah,ed by arguing 1ha1 smce
there are subslallual fixed costs m stock issues. finm tend 10 make large is,ues that drive 1heir dcb1 rauos
below target levels. Thus, they rend 10 make cash acqu1'>111ons which rai,e 1hc1r debt levels. Use of an
mdusll)' deb1 rauo (instead of the bidders preacqu1s111on rauo) 111 1hc deb1 change variable may provide
a be11er control and could affect 1he sign of 1h1, s1ock offer variable. In any case 1he results do not
support our theory.
Hansen's model 1s probably lhe most elaborate and comple1e model discussed here, but 1hc data do
nor suppon it The pos111ve sign of the size variable which 1s s1gmfica111 at 1he 0.10 level m 1he univariate
analysis (bur not in 1he log11) 1s not as 1he model would predict. Hansen's model prcd1c1s 1ha1 1he
beneficial conungenr-pricing e1Tec1 of stock gels stronger (lhu, 1he l1kel 1hood of cash falls) as 1he equ11y
of the targe1 relative 10 1he equ11y of 1he acquirer gels larger. We can suggest several explana11ons for
this outcome. One is simply 1ha1 deb1 financing offers raiders 1he chance 10 bid for much larger 1arge1s
1ha1 could nor be purchased from m1emal equity linancmg. Another explana11on 1s 1ha1 managers of
smaller finns are more likely 10 have a larger ownership 111 1heir finns so 1hat they are less willing 10 lose
control by issuing stock 10 ours1ders. Therefore, 1hcy prefer debt-financed cash payment 10 s1ock
exchange. Also, managers of smaller firms arc more likely 10 have held 1he stock tor a long ume and
thus have subslallt1al capital gams. To avoid a high cap11al gams rax which would result from selling 1he
stock for cash, they may prefer a stock exchange. In add111on 10 11s predic11on about size, llansen's model
predicts tha1 the probabih1y of a cash offer increases with 1he targets debt rauo and decreases w11h 1he
bidder's deb1ra110. Again, 1he signs ob1amed are norm accordance w11h 1h1s predic11on.
The optimal capital structure theory variable has the pred1c1cd sign but 1s 1101 significa111 at any
reasonable level. This may be because our proxy for optimal structure (the pre-merger leverage of rhe
bidder) is nor a good measure of the optimal capital structure of the merged finn or because of 1he lack
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ofvalidlly of 1he opumal cap11al ,truc1ure theory For example. when (m result, no1 reported here) we
used nel debl. following Bruner ( 1988). 111,1ead ol 101al debt 10 mca,urc the variable change m leverage.
the variable turned ou1 to be margmall} ,1gml ICant.1 The rc~ulh can be interpreted a, pr "1dmg ,ome
light support fo r the optimal capital ,tructurc 1hcory.
Finally, we checked the ,tab1ht} ot our re,ult, o,cr tune The charac1cmllC\ ot 1he takeo,er market
have changed over time. TI1e use ot cash payment ,tcadily mcrca,cd Ill 1hc 198(h along w11h 1he me ot
JUnk bond fi nancing and tcderal and ,tate regulall(m, ot t,tkemcr,. Thcretore m rc,ult, not reported
here we e xam ined whe ther our re,ult, remain unaltered when the sample period changed mc·lud,ng .,
dummy variable m the logit regre\\1011 "h1ch d1,11ngu1,he, ,tequ1smon, con,umma1ed Ill 19 0 to J'.ls,
andacquis111onsconwmma1ed alter 198x 10 19XK w11h a varying x. The re,ul1, arc nm st•n,111,c 10 the

period, cho!>Cn

Sl \.t\URY
Thi'> SIUd) ha, ,ought to 11l\e,11g.11e detennmanl\ ol lhe method nl pa)ment Ill Jt:q111,111on, fhe
cmpinc.tlapproach was 10 IC\I mne I manual ,ariablc, ,uggc,tcd b} t,,e h)pl>the,c, usmg ,1 b1nom1n.d
Jogil model. Our result, otter t.url} ,1rong ,uppon tor the ,Kq111,1t1on ,1rateg) theor). 81dlkrs l.1nng
competing bid, or re,1,tance by 11Kumhen1 management arc more likcl} IO u,e ca,h. The u1mpe1111on
dumm} 1s the single 1110,1 stgn1t1c.1111 , ,trt.thle 111 thl\ ,tud} 1 here 1, ,1m1lar ,1rong ,upport tor kn,en',
trecc-.1.,h !lo\\ 1he01) 1-inm \\1th tcwaprolitablc 111\estment npportun111e, and l.1rge tree c,1,h tlo" lend
10 make cash acquNt1on, a, Jensen ( 1986.l')SS) \\Ould pred1tl Problem, ot .,gen,) co,1, .md
a,ymmetrtc mtom1.11ton due 10 tree cash llo\\ 111,1) he redured h} c.1,h ,1c4u1,1t1on,
The s1gntlic,uKe ol the repurtha.'<!, .111ahk rr"' 1de, direct c, 1dc1Ke tor the 1a, a,1' .mt.1~ed d1, 1dend
,ub;11tu1e theory. Thal i,. manage men I\ thal h,I\C ,t h1,1nr, ol ,eekmg nut l,tx ad, .1111.1ged methlxh 01
<l1,1nbu1mg lund, (sh.ire repurchase,) .,re more hkeh to u,e ca,h. llo\\c,er, the postll\e ,,gn ol the
,cock 1'\UC ,anablc \\l11ch ts oppo,ue 10 our e,pet 1.111011 ,omc" h,11 m111g.11e, ,upp,,n ror 1he theor) .
hnall). m case ot the op111n.1l r.1p1t.tl structure 1hcon .tnd I l.111,en model, the ,ugge,1ed, ,1n.1hlc,
arc nm S1g111ltrant ,md m the ,·,tse ol H.,n,cn\ model , .m.1hlc, do no1 c,1rr) 1he pred1c1ed ,1gn,

\ PPI•, '\I))\.
(I) f'rce cash tl<m dumm) I hts ts .t O I ,,1rt,1ble detmetl on the b,ts,, ol the l\\ll, ,m,thlc, T.ih111', <I
rJ110 ,Uld l..:hn·Poul...:11\ tree l,Lsh Ihm lhe , art.th le " I ii the hi,kkr h.1, lo\\t't q r,1110 and higher
tree c,1,h llow lh,m ,ample ,l\eragt•,, and O nth,·r" tse
(2>

robm\ q Thts 1, the ra110 ol m.1rket ,,,luc Ill rcpl.tt,·ment costs rhc 111.irke1 ,aluc 01 ., llnn"
dc1cnn111c'll ,Ls 1hc sum nl n1m111nn ,10,k. prcterretl ,tlX k .tnd ddn. Common sllX J.. "111.1rke1 , .tlut'
,Uld prclcrred \llxk, and deht arc h,xik , .tluc, one \e,tr prior Ill the .11111ouni:ement Repl,1ct·ment
co,1da1.1,tre trom 10 K tiling,. l·nr thnse lmn, \\hKh do not repl,rt repl,Kcment rnSI \\C appl) .,n
,1lgnnthm used h\ H,tshrnuc·k ( 19 :\ \ alue I ine 1,, <>n,ultt·d ((lr .in t·,11111.ue the ,I\ cr.1,;e ,1ge
ol lhe plant. In the r,1\C ol cn111p,m1e,. \\hKh lhe ,l\etage ,t!!e nl the pl.lilt 1, lllll reported Ill the
\ aluc Line. "c estnn,uc the ,1gc a, 11 = (,1, t umul.tlcd depret 1.111011) (c urre111 depr,•n,tlll'll c,1,cn,e ).
The rcplareme111 ,atuc tor net pla111 "then c,11111a1ed h, n:,tatlll!! 1hc reported net plan1 u,111g the
consumcrpncc mdex (net pl.ml. rcpl.11:cme111 ,,tluc> (net plant. hlxik ,.tluel, • !CPI CPI ). The
replacement value ol ,mentor, "i,?encralh 1.1J..e11 a, the hook -.tlue ,t 1he reported 111e1hntl 1, H FO
or retail. \\)Heh" approxunatel) n1rret1 pro, 1ded 1men1on tumll\cr 1, 11011,x, ,lo" Finn, 1ha1
u,cd LIFO valuation al,o reported a LII·O reserve. "lni:h ·" added to the reported 111, c111<1r) 10
obtam the equ1, a lent H FO -.tluc

,,t

Southern 811 1ines.1 Re\'/ew

-5 1

(3) Bidder-target size ratio: The size variable is defined as the ratio of value of the target firm divided
by value of the bidder firm.
(4) Bidder (target) leverage: Leverage is measured a, the rauo ot total debt over total asset.
(5) Bidder stock repurchases: The stock repurchase variable is the bidder\ total repurchase in the past
two years scaled by equity value. Repurcha,;es arc defined a, u,es ot lunds which decrease
common and/or preferred stock.
(6) Change in leverage: The change m leverage 1, the bidder and target\ comohdated debt rauo
((bidder debt+ target debt)1(bidder asset+ target a,,ct)) mmus the bidder', debt rauo.
(7) Competing bid dummy· The compeung bid dumm~ "0 I variable. If there c,isted muh1plc offers
for a given target. this variable 1s assigned a one, othcrwl\e, ,cro. The c,l\tence ot multiple offers
1s obtained lrom the \\'all trcet Journal
( ) Target resistance dummy 111e target resistance dummy 1s a O I variable I he target management's
resistance to the bid is 1dcnulied lrom the \\ all Street J ournal It there 1s, a one "assigned,
01herv. 1se. zero.

E~DNOTE"
'Gilson el al. (1988) suggest 1ha1 a rich set ot potcnual tramacuonal sub,tllutcs e~isl that can yield
similar producuve outcomes and tax results. For example, a step-up 111 ba\ls might be bcucr achieved
by a sale and leaseback or b) a sale ot le\\ than all ot the target\ ,l\,cts. The principle ahematl\e to net
operating losses (:\OL) transfer 1s tor the lirm to change 11\ a,,et and hab1IH} ,tmcture to generate current
taxable mcome lo reduce the delay m ehmmaung 1ls NOL In short. acqu1s1unn, must be compared w11h
a broader range ol ahemauves to demonstrate their dominance a, a mean, ol ad11e, mg ta, gains.
>rhe purchase ol real asseL, or rcpurt11,lse of us own stock might be altcmall\es However, the tacts
that the firm may not have real investments that are expected to yield a high enough return 10 Ju;ufy
mvt:l>tmem and legal re;lriction on the repurchase ot common stock tor tax purposes ma} tavor the route
of d1stnbuung cash through acqu1su1ons.
'Shoven and Simon ( 1987) argue that both arc ncarl} eqmvalent m the ,1b,cnce ol infonnational
problem,, taxes. and transacuon costs.
'Shaven and Simon find that firms that arc more likely lO engage 111 ,1cqu1su1on, or share
repurcha,;es are predictable: 1hey have large ca,h flow and low Tobin\ q rauo. which ;uppom Jensen\
theory discussed above.
111e market reaction to the choice ol payment can be viewed as the same as that to a secunty
offering, 1.e., s1g111ticant negative returns for both stock 1ssumg linm and stcx.k ottering bidders, Jnd
nonnal returns for both debt I\Sumg !inns ,111d cash oflenng bidders (tor a IHerature sur.ey on new equuy
issue, see Smuh. 1986).
"Various analyses focus on different characterist1<:s such as bankruptcy costs. non-debt tax shield~.
and agency costs to explain the existence of an optimal capnal structure.
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'It may be that due to co-111sumnce ctlecL, the debt capacny of the combined finn 1s greater than that
of the ind1v1dual firms but that ha, not been shown conclusively and is not considered here.

' Numerous factor., hchind the high level ot competition are also mentioned in Jarrell. Brickle). and
Poulsen ( 1988). Federal (Wilham Act) and state regulat1ons ol tender otters which impose disclosure
requirements and dela) rules ha,e the effect of lostenng multiple bidder. auction contest\ and
preempt1ve b1dd111gs. Llt1ga11on and other blocking actions can pronde the necessary t1me tor the
managementol the target l1rm to '\hc,p'· the target and generate competing bids. Other factors include
mnovat1ons m takeover hnancmg. invent1ons o f defensive stmteg1cs. etc

''Tim \tudy consider- a combinat1on ol ca,h and deht secunt1e, payment as an all-cash otter, and
., combinat1on of common ,ux:I( and preferred ,tock a, an all \lock otter
' 'Tim \lud) t.11<.es the announcement date as the date that the Wall trcet Journal first mention,
that parucular ac4ul\1t1on. The hrst announcement of an ac4u1s1tion bid m the \\ all trcet J ournal
could be anything trom a rumor 10 the Imai appro,al.
" T he log hkcl1hood ra110 mdcx "defined as ( I - log hkehhood at cc,mergcnce log hkchhood at
,ero). It " ,urnlar to the R s1.111sti., m the case ol a multiple regre,\lon model ,md pro\lde, an
mdu:ation of the log1t model\ e~planator) pO\, er
'Toe hkd1h0<id rauo ,wu,uc 1, wmputc.1 to tc\l the hypothe"s that all the parameters m the model

are \lmulwneou,I) CljU,11 to ,ero. Under thl\ null hypothesl\. the \lall',IIC has an ,l\)mptouc d1stnbu11on

wb1ch is a chi -',(juare wuh the dcgn.-c, ol freedom equalling the numhcr ol parameters m the model The

sta11,11c 1s ,er) h1 •hi) '1gmllcant tor all models.
' A d1rell me,1Surc ol net debt dclmed by Bruner ( 1988) " total debt mmu, cash and c.1,h
equl\ alcnts.
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